WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

4/14/2011 8:08:24 PM

Note
MYSPACE, YOURSPACE, BUT NOT
THEIRSPACE: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
BANNING SEX OFFENDERS FROM SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES
JASMINE S. WYNTON†
ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been intense public pressure to enact
increasingly restrictive and intrusive sex offender laws. The regulation
of sex offenders has now moved online, where a growing amount of
protected expression and activity occurs. The latest trend in sex
offender policy has been the passage of state laws prohibiting sex
offenders from visiting social networking sites, such as Myspace or
Facebook. The use of these websites implicates the First Amendment
right of expressive association. Broad social-networking-site bans
threaten the First Amendment expressive association rights of sex
offenders, who do not lose all of their constitutional rights by virtue of
their conviction. Although social-networking-site bans are politically
attractive on the surface, such prohibitions are fundamentally flawed
because they are predicated on a number of widespread
misconceptions about sex offenses and sex offender behavior. These
misconceptions include the beliefs that all registered sex offenders are
violent sexual predators who have extremely high recidivism rates and
that Internet predators are increasing the incidence of sex crimes
against minors. In fact, there is very little evidence to indicate that this
type of legislation will help reduce sexual violence. This Note argues
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for empirically based and narrowly tailored sex offender policies that
will strike the appropriate balance between protecting minors from
sexual abuse and respecting sex offenders’ constitutional rights. Such
an approach is more likely to help rehabilitate offenders and thus
protect children and others from sexual predators.

INTRODUCTION
The rise in popularity among youth of social networking sites
such as Twitter, Facebook, and Myspace has increased public concern
over the dangers that sexual predators pose online. Television
1
programs such as Dateline’s To Catch a Predator and high-profile
incidents of Internet-related sex crimes have generated fears that
minors on such sites are increasingly at “high risk of assault by repeat
2
sex offenders.” Eager to protect potential victims from online
predators, legislators have enacted measures to promote child safety
on the web. These measures include laws regulating minors’ access to
3
harmful content online; laws requiring sex offenders to register their
4
Internet identities; and, in the latest wave of legislation, laws
prohibiting registered sex offenders from using social networking
5
sites.
Social networking sites have changed the way Americans
communicate, share ideas, learn information, and organize
themselves. No longer confined to personal social uses, these sites
now also serve as accessible platforms for political and social
organization. Given these expanding uses, courts should consider the
implications of broad social-networking-site bans on sex offenders’
right of expressive association.
This Note argues that recent legislation banning sex offenders
from social networking sites impermissibly restricts sex offenders’
First Amendment right to freedom of association, and that it
1. To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast).
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE U.S. 2
(2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907webwcover.pdf.
3. See Children’s Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, tit. XVII, 114 Stat. 2763A335 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2006)) (requiring libraries to install filtering software
on Internet-access terminals as a condition of federal funding).
4. See Keeping the Internet Devoid of Sexual Predators Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-400,
122 Stat. 4224 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16915a (Supp. II 2008)) (requiring sex offenders to
provide all of their Internet identities to the sex offender registry).
5. For a discussion of restrictions on sex offenders’ access to the Internet and their use of
social networking sites, see infra Part I.
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represents poor public policy. Part I examines federal courts’
treatment of computer and Internet bans as a special condition of
6
supervised release for sex offenders in child pornography cases. It
also examines the development of state legislation imposing Internet
and social-networking-site bans. Part II explores how social
networking sites are changing the contours of the right of expressive
association and argues that these sites warrant First Amendment
protection. Part III discusses the constitutional status of sex
offenders, including offenders on probation or parole and those who
have completed their sentences. Part IV addresses the constitutional
issues raised by social-networking-site bans and the policy concerns
with such bans, highlighting the ways in which these bans are
inconsistent with the available empirical evidence on sexual violence
and sex offender behavior. It concludes that these broad socialnetworking-site bans are likely unconstitutional as applied to
offenders who have completed their sentences and that they
represent poor public policy.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNET AND SOCIAL-NETWORKING-SITE
BANS IMPOSED ON SEX OFFENDERS
The practice of imposing Internet restrictions on sex offenders
originated in the courts. Before states sought to enact legislation
banning sex offenders from social networking sites, some courts were
already imposing restrictions on sex offenders’ Internet access as a
7
special condition of parole or supervised release. These judicially
imposed bans were broader than social-networking-site bans, usually
prohibiting the offender from accessing computers or the Internet
altogether. The first state legislative enactments in this area reflected
some of the various judicial approaches to computer and Internet
bans for sex offenders. But, more recently, states have begun

6. State courts have had less occasion to consider Internet and computer bans than have
the federal circuit courts. For this reason, discussion of courts addressing such restrictions will
be limited to federal courts. See Brian W. McKay, Note, Guardrails on the Information
Superhighway: Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV.
203, 233 (2003) (discussing the lack of divergence in state courts regarding Internet restrictions).
7. See Emily Brant, Comment, Sentencing “Cybersex Offenders”: Individual Offenders
Require Individualized Conditions When Courts Restrict Their Computer Use and Internet
Access, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 779, 781–83 (2009) (discussing how federal appellate courts have
reviewed challenges to computer and Internet restrictions imposed on sex offenders as
conditions of supervised release and how, recently, “certain states have attempted to take the
problem into their own hands through legislation”).
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restricting specific online destinations in addition to imposing
statutory computer and Internet bans. Although these socialnetworking-site bans may be narrower in scope than computer or
Internet bans, several states have extended their application to all
registered sex offenders, including those no longer on probation or
parole. In many cases, the bans apply even when there is no
connection between the underlying offense and the Internet or a
8
social networking site.
A. Internet Restrictions Upheld by Federal Courts as a Special
Condition of Supervised Release
The vast majority of cases in which federal courts have
considered computer and Internet bans have involved charges for the
possession of child pornography, an increasingly Internet-related
9
offense. Congress has authorized federal courts to impose special
conditions—such as Internet restrictions—on offenders placed on a
10
term of supervised release after imprisonment. Any condition
imposed on the offender, however, must be “reasonably related” to
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need to deter future
criminal conduct, to protect the public, and to rehabilitate the

8. See infra Part I.B.1.
9. See Cheryl A. Krause & Luke A.E. Pazicky, An Un-Standard Condition: Restricting
Internet Use as a Condition of Supervised Release, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 201, 202 (2008) (“To
date, aside from Mitnick, federal appellate courts have not considered Internet restrictions as a
condition of supervised release in cybercrime cases; however, they have often considered them
in child pornography cases.” (citing United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343
(9th Cir. May 14, 1998))). Under the existing federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 16,901–16,962 (2006)), also known as the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act, individuals convicted of “production or distribution of child pornography” are
required to register with local law enforcement as sex offenders. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(3)(b)(iii),
16913 (2006). In some states, a conviction for possession of child pornography can trigger a
lifelong requirement to register as a sex offender. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(4)–(6)
(West 2010) (requiring sex offenders to register based on certain predicate offenses, including
possession, production, and promotion of child pornography); see also Deborah Feyerick &
Sheila Steffen, ‘Sexting’ Lands Teen on Sex Offender List, CNN.COM (Apr. 8, 2009, 10:50 AM
EDT), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/07/sexting.busts (“In many states, like Florida, if a
person is convicted of a crime against children [such as possession of child pornography], it
automatically triggers registration to the sex offender registry.”).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2006) (delineating special supervised-release conditions courts
shall and may impose).
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defendant. The condition must also impose “no greater deprivation of
11
liberty than is reasonably necessary” to achieve these purposes.
In light of these requirements, federal appellate courts generally
12
disfavor unconditional bans on computer and Internet use. These
courts have been especially reluctant to uphold bans when the
offender was convicted only of possession of child pornography.
Possession of child pornography and a past history of sexual
exploitation of minors alone are generally not enough to justify
13
unconditional bans; rather, the defendant must have engaged in
14
conduct online that resulted in direct exploitation of a minor. In
11. Id. The sentencing factors grant judges wide discretion under the Sentencing
Guidelines to weigh and balance competing considerations in imposing conditions of supervised
release. Id. § 3553 (2006).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur sister
circuits . . . have also declined to uphold a total ban on Internet access by defendants convicted
of receiving child pornography . . . .”). But see Brant, supra note 7, at 785 (explaining the split
among federal circuits—with some courts supporting a total prohibition, others endorsing a
more narrow approach, and the rest adamantly opposing such bans—and noting that the most
common approach utilizes a probation-officer exception); Christopher Wiest, Comment, The
Netsurfing Split: Restrictions Imposed on Internet and Computer Usage by Those Convicted of a
Crime Involving a Computer, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 847, 860−61 (2003) (“[A] clear split exists. The
Seventh, Second, and Third Circuits have upheld the liberal imposition of Internet prohibitions.
On the other hand, the Eleventh, Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits favor a more restrictive
approach toward Internet prohibitions.” (footnotes omitted)).
This Note argues, however, that the federal appellate courts are not as divided over the
issue of computer and Internet bans as other authors have contended. A closer look at the
underlying facts of cases in which appellate courts have considered such restrictions reveals that
these courts are generally reluctant to impose broad bans on computer and Internet usage and
have upheld them only in cases with a “sufficient nexus” between the use of the Internet and the
direct exploitation of children. See, e.g., United States v. Heckman, 592 F.3d 400, 407 (3d Cir.
2010) (“If [defendant’s ban is] upheld . . . , this would be the first time that we have upheld an
Internet ban for a conviction involving the transmission of child pornography rather than the
direct exploitation of children. In fact, considering these factors collectively, [the defendant’s]
special condition would be the broadest Internet ban upheld by any Circuit Court to date.”);
United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing the importance of a
“sufficient nexus” between the use of the Internet and direct exploitation of children in
upholding a conditional ban on Internet access). Even in cases in which computer and Internet
bans have been upheld, the circuit courts have strongly emphasized that such restrictions must
not infringe a defendant’s Internet use more than necessary and have “admonished sentencing
judges to tailor Internet conditions narrowly to the end to be served.” Krause & Pazicky, supra
note 9, at 202.
13. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 324 F.3d 1025, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Appellate courts
have overturned conditions seen as overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple
possession of child pornography.”).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003) (rejecting a ban on
computer and Internet usage following a conviction for possession of child pornography when
there was no evidence that the defendant, a previously convicted child molester, used the
Internet to contact young children).
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cases lacking this online component, most federal appellate courts
prefer narrowly tailored conditions—such as requiring installation of
monitoring and filtering hardware, installation of software that blocks
access to prohibited websites, or unannounced inspections of the
offender’s devices by probation officers—as alternatives to absolute
15
bans.
Conversely, for defendants convicted of “child pornography
plus”—meaning the offender “engaged in threatening conduct
16
beyond mere possession” of child pornography —federal appellate
courts have shown a greater willingness to uphold computer and
17
Internet bans. Conduct that may warrant harsher restrictions on
computer and Internet use includes directly sexually exploitative
conduct, such as the use of the Internet to develop an illegal sexual
18
relationship with a minor; use of the Internet to advise others on
19
how to solicit children for illicit purposes; sale of subscriptions to

15. See, e.g., Holm, 326 F.3d at 878−79 (suggesting, as an alternative to a total ban on
Internet access, “[v]arious forms of monitored Internet use” or other “precise restrictions that
protect the child-victims used in Internet pornography”); Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392 (reversing a
ban on the use of computers with Internet access without probation-officer approval and
suggesting instead “a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images,”
enforced through unannounced computer inspections). Furthermore, one circuit court has
suggested that “the Government can check on [defendant’s] Internet usage with a sting
operation” as an alternative to a broad ban on Internet usage. United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d
122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2002).
16. Krause & Pazicky, supra note 9, at 202.
17. See, e.g., United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 2007) (“A restriction on
computer usage does not constitute an abuse of discretion if . . . the defendant used his
computer to do more than merely possess child pornography, particularly if the prohibition on
computer usage is not absolute.”); Holm, 326 F.3d at 878 (“We find it notable that this court’s
concerns . . . are reflected in the decisions of our sister circuits, which have also declined to
uphold a total ban on Internet access by defendants convicted of receiving child pornography
without at least some evidence of the defendant’s own outbound use of the Internet to initiate
and facilitate victimization of children.”); Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027 (“In cases where defendants
used computers or the internet to commit crimes involving greater exploitation, such [broad]
restrictions have been upheld.”); see also Krause & Pazicky, supra note 9, at 202 (noting that
courts “have been more willing to affirm broad bans” when the defendant’s conduct was more
egregious than simple possession of child pornography).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125–28 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding an
Internet ban against a defendant who used the Internet to meet a fourteen-year-old female with
whom he engaged in sexual relations and of whom he took sexually explicit photographs,
including one depicting the two of them engaging in sexual activity).
19. See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 2001) (upholding a three-year ban
on computer and Internet use against a defendant who possessed child pornography on his
computer and advised other consumers of child pornography on how to find “young friends”).

WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

4/14/2011 8:08:24 PM

SEX OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

1865

20

websites featuring child pornography; or use of online child
21
pornography to groom children for sexual relationships. Even in
these cases, however, courts remain hesitant to uphold absolute
22
bans. Instead, courts have held that bans should contain exceptions
that allow the offender some legitimate uses of computers and the
Internet. These exceptions include the probation-officer exception, in
which the offender is banned from computer and Internet use unless
23
specifically approved by a probation officer, and the employment

20. See Fields, 324 F.3d at 1027 (upholding conditional computer and Internet restrictions
against a defendant who operated an online child pornography service).
21. See United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 867–68 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding a
conditional Internet ban against a defendant who admitted that child pornography he accessed
online played a role in his sexual assault of his two-year-old niece). “Grooming” refers to the
process by which a child victim is lured into sexual abuse. For instance, child pornography may
be shown to potential victims in order to normalize and encourage child sexual activities.
22. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have recently upheld lifetime bans on computer or
Internet access in opinions that are not precedential. See United States v. Fortenberry, 350 F.
App’x 906, 911 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a conditional lifetime ban barring the defendant from
using the Internet without prior approval from a probation officer); United States v. Dove, 343
F. App’x 428, 433 (11th Cir. 2009) (upholding a lifetime Internet ban for a convicted sex
offender who used the Internet to lure someone he thought was a thirteen-year-old girl to
engage in sexual conduct, even though his contact was actually with an undercover investigator).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that
conditioning a defendant’s access to the Internet on prior approval from a probation officer
does not “involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purpose
because it is not absolute; rather, it allows for approval of appropriate online access by the
Probation Office”); United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1093 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that an
Internet prohibition was “not overly broad in that [the defendant] may still use the Internet for
valid purposes by obtaining his probation officer’s prior permission”).
Some circuits have even struck down conditional bans that allowed use of a computer
or the Internet only with the approval of a probation officer. See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky,
287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a conditional ban on Internet access subject to the
approval of a probation officer was nonetheless “a greater deprivation on [the defendant’s]
liberty than [was] reasonably necessary”). In fact, such conditions have raised concerns among
reviewing courts about the discretion afforded to probation officers. See United States v. Scott,
316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Terms should be established by judges ex ante, not probation
officers acting under broad delegations and subject to loose judicial review ex post . . . . Courts
should do what they can to eliminate open-ended delegations, which create opportunities for
arbitrary action—opportunities that are especially worrisome when the subject concerns what
people may read. Is the probation officer to become a censor who determines that [the
defendant] may read the New York Times online, but not the version of Ulysses at
Bibliomania.com? Bureaucrats acting as guardians of morals offend the first amendment as well
as the ideals behind our commitments to the rule of law.”); United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d
981, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (noting that “the vagueness of the special condition leaves open the
possibility that the probation office might unreasonably prevent [the defendant] from accessing
one of the central means of information-gathering and communication in our culture today”).
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exception, in which offenders are allowed to use computers and the
24
Internet in the workplace or in an employment search.
As some commentators have noted in the context of sex offender
computer and Internet bans, federal appellate courts are “moving
toward accepting the internet as a basic freedom that even convicts
25
should not be permanently denied.” In striking down computer and
Internet bans in child pornography possession cases, many courts
have acknowledged that “[c]omputers and Internet access have
become virtually indispensable in the modern world of
26
communications and information gathering.” Some courts have
likened the Internet’s “instant link to information” to “opening a
27
book” and its communicative properties to those of a telephone.
According to one court, just as a conviction for mail fraud would not
28
justify a prohibition on the use of the mails, a ban on Internet access
would not be justified solely because “a computer with Internet
29
access offers the possibility of abusive use for illegitimate purposes.”
“A total ban on Internet access prevents use of e-mail, an increasingly
widely used form of communication,” and other legitimate “commonplace computer uses such as ‘do[ing] any research, get[ting] a weather
30
forecast, or read[ing] a newspaper online.’” Consequently, an
unconditional Internet ban “renders modern life . . . exceptionally
31
32
difficult.” As a result, “a total restriction rarely could be justified.”

24. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 81 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that the
special condition of supervised release imposed by the district court banning the defendant from
computer and Internet usage contained an exception for “employment purposes as authorized
by the probation officer”).
25. David Kravets, 30-Year Computer Ban for Sex Offender Overturned, WIRED THREAT
LEVEL (Apr. 2, 2010, 7:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/04/computer-ban.
26. Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83; see also Zinn, 321 F.3d at 1093 (“[T]he Internet has become an
important resource for information, communication, commerce, and other legitimate uses.”);
United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (finding that a special condition
prohibiting the defendant from possessing a computer with Internet access was overly broad
and a greater deprivation than necessary, given that it would “bar [defendant] from using a
computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online”).
27. White, 244 F.3d at 1207.
28. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126.
29. Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83.
30. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (alteration in original) (quoting White, 244 F.3d at 1206).
31. United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878 (7th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the court took into
consideration the defendant’s need to earn a living and to reenter society successfully, noting
that “the conditions as currently written could affect his future productivity and jeopardize his
rehabilitation.” Id.
32. United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003).
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B. State Social-Networking-Site Bans
The tailored approach of the federal courts to Internet
restrictions in child pornography cases indicates a need to fashion
individualized sentences for sex offenders, because not all sex
offenders pose the same risks to the public after release. As states
have begun to legislate in this area, however, many have enacted
broader legislation restricting sex offenders’ use of computers and the
Internet. Some states have imposed explicit bans on the use of social
networking sites by sex offenders. Unlike court-imposed computer
and Internet bans, some states impose Internet restrictions on sex
offenders without regard to whether the underlying offenses had any
connection to computers or the Internet. Some states have enacted
social-networking-site bans that apply to all registered sex offenders,
including those who have completed their sentences. Some state laws
even require courts to impose computer, Internet, or socialnetworking-site bans on certain offenders as conditions of probation
or parole, curbing courts’ discretion to impose narrowly tailored
restrictions when circumstances warrant a more limited approach.
1. Broad Bans Applying to Registered Sex Offenders Who Have
Completed Their Sentences. Some state legislatures have addressed
the threat of online sexual predators by enacting blanket socialnetworking-site bans that apply to all registered sex offenders,
regardless of the nature of their offenses and whether they have
completed their sentences, including probation or parole. Thus, in
these states, offenders who did not use a computer in the commission
of the underlying offenses are still subject to a ban. North Carolina
enacted such a statute in 2008, making it a Class I felony for a
registered sex offender to access a “commercial social networking
33
website.” The statute does not limit the ban to offenders serving

33. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5(b) (Supp. 2010). For the purposes of the statute, North
Carolina defines a “commercial social networking Web site” as an Internet site that:
1) Is operated by a person who derives revenue from membership fees, advertising, or
other sources related to the operation of the Web site.
2) Facilitates the social introduction between two or more persons for the purposes of
friendship, meeting other persons, or information exchanges.
3) Allows users to create Web pages or personal profiles that contain information
such as the name or nickname of the user, photographs placed on the personal Web
page by the user, other personal information about the user, and links to other
personal Web pages on the commercial social networking Web site of friends or
associates of the user that may be accessed by other users or visitors to the Web site.
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probation or parole, or to those who are under some form of state
supervision. Moreover, the statute does not restrict the ban to
particular types of offenders, such as high-risk offenders, or types of
34
offenses, like Internet-related sex offenses. Rather, North Carolina
bans all registered sex offenders from accessing all social networking
sites where the sex offender “knows that the site permits minor
children to become members or to create or maintain personal Web
35
pages.”
Some states, including Nebraska, have elected to limit their
social-networking-site bans to certain registered sex offenders, such
as those who have committed crimes against children—including
36
possession of child pornography. Though Nebraska’s ban is limited
to one class of offenders, it applies to all registered sex offenders in
37
that class, including those who have completed probation or parole.
The Nebraska ban prohibits more than just sex offender use of social
networking sites—it bans the use of instant messaging and chatroom
38
services as well. Indiana has enacted a similar social-networking-site
ban, limiting its application to registered sex offenders convicted of
committing a crime against a child or found to be sexually violent
39
predators.
4) Provides users or visitors to the commercial social networking Web site
mechanisms to communicate with other users, such as a message board, chat room,
electronic mail, or instant messenger.
Id. The statute excludes from its reach any website that “[p]rovides only one of the following
discrete services: photo-sharing, electronic mail, instant messenger, or chat room or message
board platform,” or “[h]as as its primary purpose the facilitation of commercial transactions
involving goods or services between its members or visitors.” Id. § 14-202.5(c).
34. See id. § 14-202.5(a) (“It is unlawful for a sex offender who is registered in accordance
with Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes to access a commercial social
networking web site.” (emphasis added)).
35. Id. § 14-202.5(a) (2008).
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05(1)(a)–(j) (2009). Nebraska’s social-networking-site ban,
along with other provisions of its statute relating to sex offenders’ use of computers and the
Internet, was recently challenged in federal court. The court found parts of the statute
unconstitutional as applied to sex offenders no longer on probation or parole, and the judge
granted a new trial to address the constitutionality of the social-networking-site ban. See Doe v.
Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 937 (D. Neb. 2010); see also infra notes 123–26 and
accompanying text.
37. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-322.05(1) (applying the ban to “[a]ny person required to
register under the Sex Offender Registration Act”).
38. Id. (prohibiting registered sex offenders from “knowingly and intentionally” using
social networking sites, instant messaging services, or chatrooms that minors are allowed to
use).
39. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-12(e) (LexisNexis 2009) (banning sex offenders convicted of
offenses against children from knowingly or intentionally using a social networking site, instant
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2. State Bans Applying Only to Offenders on Probation or Parole.
Some social-networking-site bans do not apply to all registered sex
offenders, but instead apply only to probationers or parolees
convicted of certain sex offenses. Some states require courts to
impose social-networking-site bans as a condition of probation or
parole, rather than allowing courts the flexibility to fashion terms
specific to the particular offender. For instance, New York mandates
that for registered sex offenders who have committed an offense
against a minor, offenders at greatest risk of reoffense, and offenders
who used the Internet to facilitate commission of a crime, “the court
shall require, as [a] mandatory condition[] of [probation or
conditional discharge] that such sentenced offender be prohibited
from using the internet to access . . . a commercial social networking
40
website.”
Texas has taken a similar approach, applying its ban to registered
sex offenders convicted of crimes against children, offenders who
used a computer in the commission of the offense, and offenders
41
assigned the highest risk level. If such an offender is released on
parole or mandatory supervision, the parole panel “shall prohibit the
releasee from using the Internet to . . . access a commercial social
42
networking site.” Minnesota has also elected to limit the reach of its
social-networking-site ban to offenders who pose a higher risk to the
43
community—those placed on “intensive supervised release.” Such
offenders are not only prohibited from using social networking sites,
but they are also banned from using instant-messaging programs or
44
chatrooms that allow minors to use their services.

messaging program, or chatroom that “the offender knows allows a person who is less than
eighteen (18) years of age to access or use”). If the offender contacts a child or a person he
believes to be a child online through such services, the offense is a Class D felony. Id. § 35-42-412(e)(2). For the statutory definition of “sexually violent predator,” see IND. CODE ANN. § 3538-1-7.5(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010).
40. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(4-a)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2011).
41. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–(3) (West Supp. 2010).
42. Id. § 508.1861(b)(2).
43. MINN. STAT. § 244.05(6)(c) (2009).
44. Id. The Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections has discretion to place offenders on
intensive supervised release if it will further statutorily prescribed goals or if the inmate was
convicted of certain offenses. Id. § 244.05(6)(b). All level III predatory offenders are placed on
intensive supervised release. Id. § 244.05(6)(a). In order to enforce this prohibition, the
Department of Corrections is authorized to conduct “unannounced searches” of the inmate’s
“computer or other electronic devices capable of accessing the Internet.” Id. § 244.05(6)(b).
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II. HOW SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES ARE REDEFINING
EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
State social-networking-site bans are being imposed during an
explosion in the popularity of social media. No longer simply sources
of entertainment or leisure, social networking sites have become vital
tools for social and political organization and expression,
transforming how individuals communicate and collaborate. Indeed,
social media have become a primary way in which individuals exercise
their First Amendment freedom to associate with groups and causes.
Thus, courts must consider whether broad social-networking-site bans
infringe on this freedom of association by excessively burdening the
ability of all sex offenders—including those who have already paid
their debt to society—to exercise this right.
A. The First Amendment Right of Expressive Association
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
45
for a redress of grievances.” Although the First Amendment does
not explicitly enumerate the right to freedom of association, it is well
established that there is a “right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—
speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the
46
exercise of religion.” This right of expressive association protects the
right of individuals to “associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and
47
cultural ends.” Even though social networking sites differ from
traditional offline associations in many respects, the Supreme Court

45. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
46. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
47. Id. at 622. The Supreme Court has recognized two distinct rights of freedom of
association. First, there is a right of intimate association, which is recognized as “a fundamental
element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.” Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). Examples of intimate relationships to which the Court has
extended constitutional protection are “those that attend the creation and sustenance of a
family,” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619, such as “marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child
rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives,” Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545 (citations
omitted). Second, there is a right of expressive association, rooted in the First Amendment,
which is the focus of this Note. For background regarding the constitutional evolution of both
forms of the right of association, see generally John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the
Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485 (2010).
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has defined protected expressive association broadly. Social
networking sites, which support and complement traditional offline
associations and facilitate the creation of new associations that might
not otherwise exist, should come within that definition’s reach.
To receive First Amendment protection, a group must, as a
threshold matter, be engaged “in some form of expression, whether it
48
be public or private.” This right of association extends to the
49
individual, not just the group. Moreover, as the Court explained in
50
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, “[A]ssociations do not have to
associate for the ‘purpose’ of disseminating a certain message in order
to be entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. An
association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
51
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.” The right of
expressive association is “more than the right to attend a meeting; it
includes the right to express one’s attitudes or philosophies by
membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful
52
means.”
The First Amendment does not protect all association, however.
53
In City of Dallas v. Stanglin, the Supreme Court declined to
recognize “a generalized right of ‘social association’ that includes
54
chance encounters in dance halls.” At issue in Stanglin was whether
dance hall patrons coming together to engage in recreational dancing
55
constituted a protected association. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, observed that “[i]t is possible to find some kernel of
expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for
example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at a
shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity

48. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000); see also Christian Legal Soc’y
Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3010 (2010)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“The First Amendment protects the right of ‘“expressive association”’—
that is, ‘the right to associate for the purpose of speaking.’” (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 68 (2006))).
49. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977) (“Our decisions establish
with unmistakable clarity that the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of
advancing beliefs and ideas is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” (emphasis
added)).
50. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
51. Id. at 655.
52. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
53. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id.
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within the protection of the First Amendment.” Some opportunities
“might be described as ‘associational’ in common parlance, but they
simply do not involve the sort of expressive association that the First
57
Amendment has been held to protect.”
B. Social Networking Sites as Expressive Associations
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the Internet’s
58
important role in facilitating the dissemination of protected speech,
it has not acknowledged the Internet’s role in facilitating expressive
association to the same extent. Case law illustrates a well-protected
right of expressive association for traditional, formal associations such
as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) and the Boy Scouts of America. But freedom-ofassociation doctrine has not yet adapted to the Internet age and its
59
unconventional emerging associations. As an increasing amount of
expressive activity shifts to online spaces, expressive association
protections must be extended from traditional associations to the new
60
forms of association made possible by social media.
Like traditional offline associations, social networking sites
enable users to create communities for the purpose of expressing
ideas, sharing information, and communicating with others—
expressive activities that have traditionally been afforded First
Amendment protection. Accordingly, such sites should qualify as
protected expressive associations under the Supreme Court’s broad
definition.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 24.
58. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (“This dynamic, multifaceted category of
communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and
still images, as well as interactive, real-time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer. . . . ‘[T]he content on the Internet is as diverse as human
thought.’” (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996))). The Supreme
Court held in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), that expression on the Internet, like that in
print media, receives full First Amendment protection. See id. at 849.
59. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First
Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741, 748 (2008) (noting that
freedom-of-association case law has generally been concerned with the rights of “existing,
formal associations and has not yet been adapted to the networked world”).
60. See id. at 785 (discussing emergent organizations that use email and other forms of
digital communication and examining how relational surveillance implicates First Amendment
interests).
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In two recent cases, the Court has acknowledged the increasing
importance of social networking sites as avenues of expression for
individuals and associations. In Citizens United v. Federal Election
61
Commission, the Court explained that while “television ads may be
the most effective way to convey a political message . . . it may be that
Internet sources, such as blogs and social networking websites, will
provide citizens with significant information about political
62
candidates and issues.” The Court also explained, in Christian Legal
63
Society v. Martinez, that “the advent of electronic media and socialnetworking sites reduces the importance of . . . channels” of
communication like newsletters, designated bulletin boards, and in64
person networking events.
As the Court has indicated, social networking sites are forcing
65
the public to reconceptualize the notion of an association. Members
of online social networks can use the websites to “maintain preexisting social networks” as well as to “build new networks with
66
strangers based on shared interests, political views or activities.” On
many social networking sites, members can create profiles sharing
personal information and can communicate with other members
through private messages, less-private “comments,” instant

61. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
62. Id. at 913 (citations omitted).
63. Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v.
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
64. Id. at 2991.
65. See Christi Cassel, Note, Keep Out of MySpace!: Protecting Students from
Unconstitutional Suspensions and Expulsions, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 669 (2007) (arguing
that students who participate in online social networking spaces such as Myspace groups
“deserve full protection to associate freely under the First Amendment”); Jonathan Sabin,
Note, Every Click You Make: How the Proposed Disclosure of Law Students’ Online Identities
Violates Their First Amendment Right to Free Association, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 669, 703 (2009)
(arguing that “blogs and social-networking activity, conducted with online aliases, email and IP
addresses, are ‘expressive associations’”). Krist Novoselic, bass player in the rock band Nirvana,
has also argued that social networking is changing the First Amendment rights of assembly and
political association. Focusing on the 2008 presidential campaign, Novoselic asserted that social
networking has already changed the terrain of elections, stating that “[President Barack]
Obama’s campaign reinforced the power of association . . . .” Laila Barakat, Former Nirvana
Bassist to Visit Sac State, STATE HORNET (Sacramento), Sept. 22, 2010, at A1 (alteration in
original).
66. Minjeong Kim, The Right to Anonymous Association in Cyberspace: US Legal
Protection for Anonymity in Name, in Face, and in Action, 7 SCRIPTED 51, 52 (2010).
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messaging, blogging, and photo- or video-sharing capabilities.
Further, some sites allow members to exercise “a degree of
selectivity” by making their profiles accessible only to certain
68
individuals or groups. Online networks like Facebook even allow
members to create subgroups within the larger network based on
69
shared interests in a particular social or political cause. Before
individuals are allowed to join these subgroups, however, they must
become members of the larger online community by signing up for
70
memberships and creating user profiles.
Niche social networking websites that cater to specific groups,
interests, or topics also resemble traditional associations. Unlike
social networking sites that accommodate a more general audience,
niche social networking sites like BlackPlanet and MyChurch target
specific groups—African Americans and Christian churches that
71
follow the Nicene Creed, respectively. Because these social
networking sites center on a certain theme, idea, or ideology,
becoming a member communicates a certain message to the outside
world. That message is deserving of protection as a form of expressive
association.
The act of joining a particular social network in itself can be an
72
expressive associational activity. Online social networks have
enabled people to organize more easily by “lower[ing] the costs of

67. danah m. boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and
Scholarship, J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM., Oct. 2007, http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/
boyd.ellison.html.
68. Sabin, supra note 65, at 724.
69. See Cassel, supra note 65, at 669 (“Some [Myspace] groups, such as Food Not Bombs
and Support Same-Sex Marriages!, encourage support of popular social and political issues.
Others, such as Occult Studies and Anarcho-Communism, offer a forum for people with
alternative or unpopular views to discuss their ideas and opinions.” (footnotes omitted)).
70. See Sabin, supra note 65, at 724 (“Also, like traditional organizations, Facebook has
formalized membership procedures whereby individuals must create an elaborate user profile in
order to join a particular network.”).
71. See BLACKPLANET, http://www.blackplanet.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2011);
MYCHURCH, http://www.mychurch.org/info/about.php (last visited Apr. 5, 2011). BlackPlanet
claims to be the largest African-American website in the world and features “music, jobs,
forums, chat, photos, dating personals and groups all targeted to the specific interests of the
black community.” BLACKPLANET, supra. The website MyChurch “hosts private social
networks for churches” for “their congregations to help their members ‘be church’ online.”
MYCHURCH, supra. According to the site’s “About Us” page, “[c]hurch members can post
prayer requests, and share needs and resources on the bulletin board,” and “[p]astors can send
out announcements and upload their sermons.” Id.
72. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 882 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Joining is
one method of expression.”).
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collective activity and decreas[ing] the importance of geographical
73
proximity.” Social networking sites are not merely sources of leisure
or entertainment; they have become serious tools for political and
social organizing. Myspace’s “Impact Channel” is an example of how
these sites actively assist their members in advocating for political and
social causes. Launched in 2007, the channel served as a virtual town
square during the 2008 presidential election campaign, housing
official Myspace profiles of the candidates and providing them with
platforms from which to communicate directly with voters. The
profiles, which also featured voter registration, fundraising, and
74
volunteering tools, formed an online community “designed to
empower politicians, non-profits, and civic organizations to connect
with users around the world and engage the Myspace community to
75
drive political awareness and promote causes they care about.”
In the political context, social media outlets provide new tools
for organizing and financing campaigns, mobilizing voters and
volunteers, and finding out where candidates stand on the issues. The
2008 presidential election demonstrated how social networking sites
can be used to “fuel[] political association” and can serve as robust
76
platforms for grassroots organizing. This historic election witnessed
the emergence of new and creative uses of social media for civic and
political purposes. Presidential candidates—in particular, President
77
Barack Obama —reached out to younger voters through social
73. Strandburg, supra note 59, at 750; see also Jay Krasovec, Cyberspace: The Final
Frontier, for Regulation?, 31 AKRON L. REV. 101, 137 (1997) (“The ease of the Internet
provides the ability and motivation for people to join a multitude of organizations they may
have otherwise not. The home computer user simply has to pull-up an organization’s home page
and begin a dialogue.”).
74. Alex Williams, The Future President, on Your Friends List, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007,
at I1.
75. Myspace Safety for Parents & Educators, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/help/
safety/parents (last visited Apr. 5, 2011).
76. Steven Chea, Nirvana Bassist Talks Politics, Social Networking, SACRAMENTO PRESS,
Sept. 24, 2010, http://www.sacramentopress.com/headline/37767/Nirvana_bassist_talks_politics_
social_networking. According to Novoselic, social media are the “association” of the 21st
century, and social networks will continue to shape the political future, especially in regard to
campaign financing. Id.
77. President Obama went further than did other candidates in utilizing technology to help
garner support and to interact with voters. His embrace of social media allowed for effective
grassroots organizing unmatched by his opponents. In fact, a Los Angeles Times blog post
dubbed President Obama the “first social media president.” David Sarno, Obama, the First
Social Media President, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/
2008/11/obama-the-first.html. During the campaign, Obama’s team posted eighteen hundred
videos to YouTube, including his memorable speech on race. Id.
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networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube,
80
engaging youth in the political process in record numbers. Realizing
that social media can lower the barriers to participation in the
political process by creating new ways to engage audiences in civic
dialogue, President Obama continues to use social media in his
presidency; YouTube, for example, features its own White House
81
Channel. President Obama publishes his weekly video address,
along with other media, on the White House Channel, and he
conducts live question-and-answer sessions with members of the
82
public through YouTube’s news and politics blog, CitizenTube.
Social networking sites have also provided speakers and
protestors around the world with uniquely visible platforms to reach
interested fellow citizens in ways that street protests and rallies
83
cannot. For instance, social media played a significant role in helping
Iranian dissident groups unite, organize, and voice their concerns to
the outside world following Iran’s disputed 2009 presidential election.
To keep protestors from sharing footage of what was happening in
the streets of Tehran, the Iranian government took steps to limit

78. See, e.g., SUZANNE SOULE & JENNIFER NAIRNE, CIVIC EDUCATION AND YOUTH
TURNOUT IN THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: DATA FROM ENGAGED CITIZENS, WE THE
PEOPLE ALUMNI NETWORK 12 (2009), available at http://www.civiced.org/pdfs/research/WPSA
_Soule_Nairne.pdf (“Candidates reached out to [young voters], using technology to meet them
on their turf to solicit their votes, time and money.”).
79. In the words of one commentator, “The Obama team has written the playbook on how
to use YouTube for political campaigns.” Jose Antonio Vargas, The YouTube Presidency,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/11/the-youtubepresidency.html (quoting Steve Grove, YouTube head of news and politics). This “new level of
online communication” with the public helped “cultivate a sense of community amongst
supporters.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
80. The 2008 election witnessed the third-largest youth voter turnout in American history.
Press Release, Ctr. for Info. & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, New Census Data
Confirm Increase in Youth Voter Turnout in 2008 Election (Apr. 28, 2009), available at http://
www.civicyouth.org/PopUps/Census_Youth_Voter_2008.pdf. Political analysts have cited this
large youth turnout as a critical factor in President Obama’s victory over Senator John McCain.
Melissa Dahl, Youth Vote May Have Been Key in Obama’s Win, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 5, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27525497.
81. whitehouse’s Channel, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/user/whitehouse (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011).
82. Michael D. Shear, Obama’s YouTube Question and Answer Session, WASH. POST, Feb.
1, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/02/obamas-youtube-question-and-an.html.
83. Lyrissa Lidsky, Why Governments Use Social Media and Why They Should,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Sept. 13, 2010, 9:19 AM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/09/
why-governments-use-social-media-and-why-they-should.html.
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84

Internet access and block text-messaging services. Iranians quickly
found “novel ways around the restrictions,” however, by “blogging,
posting to Facebook and, most visibly, coordinating their protests on
85
Twitter.” Posting to Twitter did not replace traditional means of
organizing, but it quickly became an extremely useful tool to win
international attention. Social media played a similar role in the
Egyptian revolution in early 2011, helping the revolutionaries to
organize and garner international attention and support for their
86
cause. Although decades of despotic rule and repression “were
kindling for the Egyptian revolution,” social media were “both a
87
spark and an accelerant for the movement.” Social networking sites
like Twitter can thus help political movements gain momentum,
coordinate their efforts, and circumvent security barriers more easily
88
than traditional offline associations.
Nevertheless, some critics argue that online networks are not
formal enough to be entitled to constitutional protection or that social
89
media platforms are built around weak ties ties unlike those
traditionally protected by the First Amendment right of association.
Recognizing online social networking sites as protected expressive
associations, however, would not create the same type of concerns as
would extending constitutional protection to “chance encounters in
90
dance halls.” Though social networking sites may be used for leisure
and social purposes, the right of association is not limited to political
forms of association. The Supreme Court has extended First

84. See Brad Stone & Noam Cohen, Social Networks Spread Defiance Online, N.Y. TIMES,
June 16, 2009, at A11.
85. Id.
86. See Sam Gustin, Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire, WIRED
EPICENTER (Feb. 11, 2011, 2:56 PM), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/egypts-revolution
ary-fire.
87. Id.
88. See Evgeny Morozov, Iran Elections: A Twitter Revolution?, WASH. POST, June 17,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2009/06/17/DI2009061702232.
html (“Twitter is [being] used to publicize protests that are already going on—and bring the
world’s attention to the acts of violence committed by the regime. Twitter’s open platform and
excellent ability to quickly spread information in decentralized fashion are perfect for
this . . . .”). Though critics may argue that platforms such as Twitter are not “particularly helpful
for planning a revolution,” they acknowledge that “in terms of involving the huge Iranian
diaspora and everyone else with a grudge against Ahmadinejad, [Twitter was] very successful”
during the Iranian protests. Id.
89. E.g., Malcolm Gladwell, Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 4, 2010, at 42, 45–46.
90. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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Amendment protection to “forms of ‘association’ that are not
political in the customary sense but that pertain to the social, legal,
91
and economic benefit of the members.” Further, social networking
sites help groups organize to engage in speech or assembly for
political purposes, which is “the kind of activity to which the First
92
Amendment ordinarily offers its strongest protection.” Social
networking sites have also made it easier for individuals to connect
with others who share similar interests or values. The strength of
social networking sites is in their simplicity, informality, and
flexibility. According to Professor Jonathan Zittrain, “The qualities
that make Twitter seem inane and half-baked are what make it so
93
powerful.” Because of their accessibility and their ability to
democratize information and connect people across geographic
boundaries, social networking sites should be recognized as the
powerful tools for social and political organization that they are.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF SEX OFFENDERS
As the role of the Internet has expanded, sex offenders have
challenged the constitutionality of statutes restricting their ability to
access the Internet. Most challenges have been brought on the
grounds that such restrictions are an invalid condition of probation,
parole, or supervised release because they fail to meet the
requirements of the relevant sentencing statute. Some offenders have
challenged conditions on First Amendment grounds as well; however,
courts have been generally reluctant to address these constitutional
claims because to do so would require them to consider the differing
94
rights of sex offenders. Unlike persons who have not been convicted

91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
92. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2732 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“‘Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough hierarchy in the
constitutional protection of speech’ in which ‘[c]ore political speech occupies the highest, most
protected position.’” (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))).
93. Stone & Cohen, supra note 84.
94. See, e.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although the
[defendant] also insists the prohibition violates his First Amendment rights, we do not reach this
question. As discussed, the meaning of the condition itself makes it susceptible to remand, not
its constitutionality.”); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (dismissing
defendant’s First Amendment freedom of speech and association challenges to a computer and
Internet ban without performing a constitutional analysis, on the grounds that the ban met the
requirements set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3583). Courts have also been reluctant to engage in this
constitutional review when the defendant is not a sex offender but a convicted computer hacker.
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of a crime, who enjoy full constitutional rights, probationers and
parolees have limited constitutional rights during their terms of
conditional release. It is less clear, however, what kind of
constitutional rights convicted persons possess once they have
completed their terms of probation and parole.
A. Rights of Offenders on Probation, Parole, or Supervised Release
Federal and state sentencing statutes authorize courts and parole
authorities to grant offenders terms of probation, parole, or
supervised release, which “are all different forms of conditional
95
release from prison.” Whereas probation is supervision imposed by a
court as an alternative to imprisonment, parole is a form of
supervision granted by a parole board following an early release from
96
prison. Similar to parole is the federal system of supervised release,
97
a period of supervision which also follows a period of incarceration.
With supervised release, however, the offender’s postconfinement
monitoring is overseen by the sentencing court, rather than the U.S.
98
Parole Commission. With the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act
99
of 1984 (SRA), Congress abolished parole for federal prisoners in
favor of a system of supervised release, making it the federal
100
government’s “preferred means of postconfinement monitoring.”

See, e.g., United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 WL 255343, at *1 (9th Cir. May 14, 1998)
(dismissing defendant’s First Amendment challenge to supervised release conditions restricting
him from accessing computers, without engaging in significant constitutional analysis). But some
circuit courts have suggested, at the very least, that some Internet restrictions may
impermissibly infringe upon the First Amendment rights of sex offenders, noting how
indispensable the Internet is as a medium of communication and that “a total restriction rarely
could be justified.” United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 737 (7th Cir. 2003).
95. United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 2007).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 401 (1991).
99. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
100. Gozlon-Peretz, 498 U.S. at 401. Persons sentenced in federal court for conduct
occurring before November 1, 1987, the effective date of the SRA, are with some exceptions
subject to special parole, whereas those who were sentenced in federal court after November 1,
1987, are subject to supervised release under the SRA. See id. at 398. Although parolees and
supervised releasees are governed by different rules under federal law, the constitutional status
of these two groups is essentially identical. Weikert, 504 F.3d at 11 n.9 (“[S]upervised release is
more closely akin to parole than to probation, and thus any distinction the Court might have
drawn between parole and probation would not differentiate parole from supervised release.”
(citations omitted)). As the differences between parolees and supervised releasees are not
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Most states, however, continue to utilize variations of the parole
system.
Though judges and parole boards have broad discretion in
fashioning special conditions for probation and parole, such
discretion is limited by sentencing guidelines and other statutes. For
instance, federal courts imposing conditions on supervised release
must meet the requirements and limiting factors set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553. This provision requires that the conditions be “reasonably
related” to the statutory goals of deterring future criminal conduct,
protecting the public, and rehabilitating the defendant, and “involve[]
no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” to
101
achieve those goals. In deciding on the particular condition to
impose, the court is to consider “the nature and circumstances of the
102
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”
In determining the validity of a probation or parole condition
that impinges upon a fundamental right, courts will look to the
relevant sentencing statute, laws governing the power of the parole
authority, or general sentencing principles. Most jurisdictions
embrace some variation of the general rule that conditions of
probation or parole must be reasonably related to the government’s
interest in the rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the
103
public.
Because challenges to probation or parole conditions are often
decided on statutory or nonconstitutional grounds, however, the level
of protection the Constitution affords to probationers and parolees
has been left substantially unanswered. Unlike ordinary citizens,
probationers and parolees “do not enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to
relevant to this Note’s analysis, the term “parolee” will be used to refer to offenders under both
the state parole system and the federal system of supervised release.
101. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(2) (2006).
102. Id. § 3553(a)(1).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Sines, 303 F.3d 793, 801 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A court may impose
conditions of supervised release which implicate fundamental rights so long as those conditions
are reasonably related to the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public from
recidivism.”); United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a condition of
supervised release is reasonably related to the dual goals of probation, the rehabilitation of the
defendant and the protection of the public, it must be upheld.” (quoting United States v.
Bortels, 962 F.2d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.
1991) (“The restriction on [defendant’s] association rights is valid if: (1) primarily designed to
meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of the public, and (2) reasonably related to such
ends.”). It would also be helpful if courts imposed an additional requirement that restrictions
bear a reasonable relationship to the crime for which the offender was convicted or to the
offender’s potential future criminality.
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which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty
properly dependent on observance of special [probation] [and parole]
104
The Supreme Court has taken a comparative
restrictions.’”
approach to analyzing the level of protection that the Constitution
affords to persons with diminished rights. There is “a continuum of
possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a
maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community
105
service.” On one end of the continuum are prisoners, who receive
106
the least amount of constitutional protection. Next are supervised
releasees, followed in descending order by parolees and
107
probationers. Because federal supervised release is “meted out in
108
addition to, not in lieu of, incarceration,” it is considered to be a
stronger punishment than probation, permitting a greater deprivation
of constitutional rights.
B. Rights of Offenders Who Have Completed Their Sentences
Though the Supreme Court has to some extent articulated the
constitutional space occupied by offenders who are on probation,
parole, or supervised release, it has made no similar pronouncement
regarding the constitutional status of those who have completed their
109
sentences. Unlike prisoners, these offenders have completed their

104. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (first alteration in original) (quoting
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972)).
105. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
106. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 n.2 (“We have recently held that prison regulations
allegedly infringing constitutional rights are themselves constitutional as long as they are
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” (quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987))).
107. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 850 (“[O]n the Court’s continuum of possible punishments,
parole is the stronger medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen’s absolute
liberty than do probationers.” (quoting United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir.
1990))).
108. United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Cardona, 903 F.2d at
63).
109. Because courts have upheld laws preventing felons from voting, serving on juries, and
possessing guns, it is commonly assumed that felons have diminished constitutional rights in
general. The abrogation of felons’ rights in these areas, however, has been upheld on much
narrower grounds. For instance, the Supreme Court has upheld laws disenfranchising felons
based upon the express language of “participation in rebellion, or other crime” in the
Apportionment Clause in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and because it was
historically viewed as valid to disenfranchise criminals with felony convictions, not because
felons have limited constitutional rights in general. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54−55
(1974). Furthermore, the constitutionality of laws categorically excluding felons from exercising
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terms of imprisonment, so there are no legitimate penological reasons
to override the exercise of their fundamental rights. And unlike
probationers and parolees, they are not subject to any supervisory
control that might otherwise justify an impingement of their
constitutional freedoms. Yet sex offenders are subject to severe
regulations, such as residency restrictions, after completing their
sentences. The Supreme Court has yet to review the constitutionality
of sex offender laws, beyond registration requirements and
community notification laws, making the constitutionality of these
110
other restrictions unclear.

Second Amendment rights is arguably unclear after District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008). At least one court has held that such prohibitions violate state constitutional law
when applied to nonviolent offenders. See Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 322–23 (N.C. 2009)
(holding that as applied to a nonviolent felon, a state law prohibiting felons from possessing
firearms violated the North Carolina Constitution).
110. Elissa Zlatkovich, Note, The Constitutionality of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions: A
Takings Analysis, 29 REV. LITIG. 219, 220 (2009). Though many states in recent years have
enacted residency restrictions banning sex offenders from certain areas offline—such as schools,
childcare facilities, or other places where children congregate—only one federal court of
appeals has considered the constitutionality of such restrictions. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700,
703–04 (8th Cir. 2005) (upholding the constitutionality of an Iowa statute that prohibited
persons who had committed a criminal sex offense against a minor from residing within 2,000
feet of a school or childcare facility). Notably, the lower court in Doe v. Miller found that Iowa’s
residency restriction violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive and procedural
due process, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination. Doe v. Miller, 298 F. Supp. 844, 880 (S.D. Iowa 2004). As with Internet
restrictions, residency restrictions go beyond both the sex offender registration schemes deemed
constitutional by the Supreme Court and the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, §§ 101–155, 120 Stat. 587, 590–611 (2006) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2250
(2006) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 16,901–16,962 (2006)). To date, the Court has only upheld sex offender
registration laws on two occasions: in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S.
1 (2003), and in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), both decided on March 5, 2003. The statutes
presented in both cases required only that sex offenders register with state or local law
enforcement and that the resulting information be made publicly available after the offenders’
release from prison. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 538 U.S. at 4−5 (noting that Connecticut’s
sex offender registration law requires offenders to “register with the Connecticut Department of
Public Safety (DPS) upon their release into the community” and that it also “requires DPS to
compile the information gathered from registrants and publicize it”); Smith, 538 U.S. at 90
(“The Alaska law, which is our concern in this case, contains two components: a registration
requirement and a notification system.”). Since these two cases were decided, a number of
states have added residency restrictions to their sex offender regulatory schemes, which have
been “challenged on various constitutional grounds, with mixed results for plaintiffs.”
Zlatkovich, supra, at 220. Some courts have upheld residency restrictions over due process,
cruel and unusual punishment, and ex post facto challenges. See, e.g., Denson v. State, 600
S.E.2d 645, 647 (Ga. 2004) (holding that a statute prohibiting convicted sex offenders from
living within 1,000 feet of a daycare facility was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law as
applied to a convicted sex offender who already lived within 1,000 feet of a day care facility).
Other state courts have struck down residency restrictions on due process, equal protection, and
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Several federal courts reviewing the constitutionality of Internet
restrictions on sex offenders who are no longer subject to supervision
have acknowledged the dearth of precedent on the subject. For
111
instance, in Doe v. Shurtleff, a federal district court held that a Utah
law requiring registered sex offenders to disclose their Internet
112
identifiers to the state violated the First Amendment. The court
noted the state’s failure to “cite any authority . . . supporting the
proposition that a sex offender who has completed his prison term
113
and is not on parole or probation gives up First Amendment rights.”
The district court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that
“even people in custody have First Amendment rights,” and on the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling “that a complete, unconditional ban on internet
access as a condition of supervised release is overly broad and
114
impermissible,” even for a repeat sex offender. The district court
further found that the defendant had “not given up his right to
115
anonymous Internet speech because of his status as a sex offender.”
116
A similar challenge was brought in Doe v. Marion County
against an Indiana law requiring registered sex offenders to submit to
searches of their personal computer equipment and to consent to the

takings grounds, among others; People v. Leroy, 828 N.E.2d 769, 777 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)
(holding that the plaintiff sex offender’s right to due process was not violated by a state statute
prohibiting child sex offenders from living within 500 feet of a school and that the regulation
was not a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment). See Mann v.
Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 653 S.E.2d 740, 760 (Ga. 2007) (holding that a residency restriction was an
impermissible taking without adequate compensation, as applied to a registered sex offender
who purchased a home in accordance with the statute but was forced to move out when a
childcare center later opened within 1,000 feet of his home); Elwell v. Township of Lower, No.
CPM-L-651-05, 2006 WL 3797974, at *14–15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Dec. 22, 2006) (holding that a local
residency restriction violated the plaintiff sex offender’s substantive due process rights under
the New Jersey Constitution because it was overly broad and failed to balance the nature of the
rights affected and the extreme intrusion on those rights with the public need for the law).
Arguably, the constitutionality of statutorily mandated residency restrictions is unclear.
111. Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2008 WL 4427594 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008),
vacated as moot, 2009 WL 2601458 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009).
112. Id. at *19. The court enjoined enforcement of the section of Utah’s sex offender
registry statute requiring registration of online identities. Id. at *9. In response, the Utah
legislature amended its statute to address the constitutional violations, and the court permitted
its enforcement. See Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2009 WL 2601458, at *1 (D. Utah
Aug. 20, 2009). The Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s constitutional challenge to the
revised statute. Doe v. Shurtleff, 628 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010).
113. Shurtleff, 2008 WL 4427594, at *19.
114. Id. at *19−20.
115. Id.
116. Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Ind. 2008).
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installation of monitoring hardware or software on their devices.
The district court ruled that sex offenders who “[h]ave completed
their sentences and are no longer on parole, probation, or any other
form of court supervision” were “entitled to full Fourth Amendment
protection, without the lowered expectation of privacy” that
118
supervised releasees have. Because the plaintiffs had completed
their punishments and “returned to society,” they “ha[d] rights under
119
the United States Constitution.” “A person’s status as a felon who is
no longer under any form of punitive supervision . . . does not permit
the government to search his home and belongings without a
120
warrant.” Accordingly, the court found that the “unprecedented
new law, however well-intentioned,” violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth
121
Amendment rights.
Most recently, a federal district court reviewed the
constitutionality of several amendments to the Nebraska Sex
122
Offender Registration Act, including one requiring registered sex
offenders to consent to warrantless searches of their computers and to
123
the installation of monitoring hardware or software. After noting
that the requirement was “foreign to the federal Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act,” the court ruled that the search
requirement was unconstitutional as applied to “persons who [were]
not presently on probation, parole or court-monitored supervision” at
124
the time of its enactment. The court observed that “cases dealing
with installing equipment to monitor persons during periods of court
or parole supervision are not persuasive” because “they either (1)
involve a judicial determination based on an individualized
assessment of need or (2) deal with persons who have a lessened
expectation of privacy because they have not yet been released from
125
criminal justice supervision.” The court found that the state had
“cited no case” to support its position that a sex offender “who has
completed his or her punishment and supervision for a sex crime was

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 865.
Id. at 865, 879.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 883.
Id. at 866.
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4001 to -4014 (2009).
Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882, 896–97 (D. Neb. 2010).
Id. at 897, 900.
Id. at 902.
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held to have a weaker claim to Fourth Amendment protection than
126
ordinary citizens.”
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
constitutionality of social-networking-site bans, several federal courts
127
have struck down other restrictions on sex offenders’ Internet use.
Without precedent or case law to suggest otherwise, federal courts
seem unwilling to hold that sex offenders who have completed their
sentences have limited First and Fourth Amendment rights.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS OF SOCIALNETWORKING-SITE BANS
A conviction for a sex offense does not completely eradicate an
individual’s constitutional rights. Social-networking-site bans,
however, threaten those rights retained by sex offenders. First
Amendment concerns should lead states to enact more narrowly
tailored restrictions on the use of social networking sites by sex
offenders on probation, parole, or supervised release, and to abandon
such legislation altogether for those offenders who have already
completed their sentences. Furthermore, broad social-networking-site
bans will likely be ineffective at reducing sexual violence, as they are
based on a number of faulty assumptions concerning sex offenders
and the nature of sexual assault. States should carefully reevaluate
the myths underlying social-networking-site bans in order to fashion
more empirically based laws that adequately serve the goals they
purport to meet.

126. Id. The Nebraska statute also included a social-networking-site ban; however, the judge
granted a new trial to address the constitutionality of this ban. Id. at 899 (“Factually, both sides
have failed to produce a record that would allow me to determine how Neb. Rev. Stat § 28322.05 (making it a crime for certain offenders to use social networking sites and instant
messaging or chat room services that allow a person under 18 to access or use such site or
service) would actually impact particular Plaintiffs or offenders more generally. Whether the
challenge is ‘as-applied’ or ‘facial,’ I must understand, as a factual matter, how the statute
works. . . . [M]y independent research suggests [the statute] may have far reaching (and,
perhaps, unintended) consequences.”). This is the only case to date involving a challenge to a
social-networking-site ban, and it is still pending.
127. Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-CV-64 TC, 2008 WL 4427594, at *4 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008),
vacated as moot, 2009 WL 2601458 (D. Utah Aug. 20, 2009).
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A. The Constitutionality of Social-Networking-Site Bans Targeting
Sex Offenders
Even though some state statutes treat all sex offenders alike, not
all registered sex offenders have the same legal status. Offenders on
probation, parole, or supervised release have diminished
constitutional rights and thus receive less constitutional protection
than those who are no longer under state supervision. At least some
courts have afforded traditional constitutional protections to sex
128
offenders who have completed their sentences. As a result, blanket
social-networking-site bans should not apply with the same force to
all registered sex offenders.
When reviewing the constitutionality of social-networking-site
bans that apply to all registered sex offenders, courts should apply
different standards to offenders on probation, parole, or supervised
release than to those who are not under state supervision. In the
context of the right to anonymous speech and the right against
suspicionless searches, courts have applied the same standards to sex
offenders who have completed their sentences as would apply to
nonoffenders. It is thus likely that in analyzing whether socialnetworking-site bans impermissibly infringe upon the associational
rights of sex offenders not on probation, parole, or supervised release,
courts would use the same constitutional standards that apply to
nonoffenders.
It is unclear what standards would apply to offenders serving
terms of probation, parole, or supervised release—all of whom
possess limited constitutional rights. Unlike restrictions determined at
sentencing, some social-networking-site bans are automatically
imposed without an individualized assessment of the offender’s
likelihood to recidivate or to commit Internet sex crimes. Many of
these bans are not “designed to prevent conduct similar to that which
[the offender] had been convicted of,” but rather are restrictions on
129
associational freedoms “quite independent of any criminal activity.”
Therefore, normally relevant sentencing rules should apply. If courts
do apply constitutional standards, they will likely use a less stringent
form of the test, similar to what courts have done when applying the

128. See supra notes 111–26 and accompanying text.
129. Best v. Nurse, No. CV 99-3727(JBW), 1999 WL 1243055, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
1999).
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Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances test to searches and
130
seizures of probationers and parolees.
1. Sex Offenders Who Have Completed Their Sentences. State
regulations that seek to ban all registered sex offenders from
accessing social networking sites directly infringe on the First
Amendment right of association. Online social networks should be
recognized as expressive associations, given that a substantial amount
of expressive activity occurs on such sites. A complete ban on the use
of social networking sites would significantly burden sex offenders’
131
ability to engage in that protected expressive activity.
The
Constitution affords standard First Amendment protection to
offenders who are no longer on probation, parole, or supervised
132
release. While the right of expressive association is not absolute, it
can only be infringed upon “by regulations adopted to serve
compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
133
associational freedoms.”
States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from
sexual violence. It is questionable, however, whether social134
networking-site bans, broadly applied, pass constitutional muster.
130. See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 852 (2006) (“Examining the totality of the
circumstances pertaining to petitioner’s status as a parolee . . . we conclude that petitioner did
not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate.”).
131. See supra Part III.
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). The “significantly less restrictive”
language used in Roberts has been equated with the strict scrutiny standard. John D. Inazu, The
Unsettling ‘Well-Settled’ Law of Freedom of Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 176 n.142
(noting that in Roberts, the Court held that “the state achieved its interest through ‘the least
restrictive means’” and “that the ‘incidental abridgement’ of protected speech ‘[was] not greater
than [was] necessary,’” and that in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), four
dissenting Justices likened the Roberts test to strict scrutiny (alterations in original) (quoting
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626, 628) (citing Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 640)).
134. In Doe v. Nebraska, 734 F. Supp. 2d 882 (D. Neb. 2010), before ordering a new trial to
address the constitutionality of a social-networking-site ban on free speech grounds, a federal
district court judge expressed his concern that the statute “may have far reaching (and, perhaps,
unintended) consequences.” Id. at 899. The judge attached to the opinion his independent
research, which illustrated “numerous examples of sites that might plausibly be banned for [sex]
offenders subject to the criminal provisions” of the law. Id. These included chatrooms on
Breastcancer.org, DiabetesDaily.com, and CivilWarHome.com; popular instant messaging
services such as Yahoo! Messenger and Gmail Chat; social networking sites such as Facebook,
Myspace, and LinkedIn; community language learning sites such as LiveMocha.com; issue
networking sites such as OneClimate.net; and medical networking support groups such as
DailyStrength.org. Id. Attachment A, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84621, at *148–54.
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By banning all use of social networking sites by sex offenders, such
regulations go “far beyond what [is] necessary to achieve a legitimate
135
governmental purpose.” Some of the social-networking-site bans
proscribe a substantial amount of constitutionally protected activity,
as they arguably prevent sex offenders from engaging in legitimate
136
protected expression not only on social networking sites but also on
other websites with social networking capabilities, such as political
137
138
blogs or the New York Times website.
There are less restrictive ways of serving states’ compelling
interest than such blanket prohibitions. Although courts have held
that states cannot constitutionally subject offenders no longer on
probation or parole to less restrictive alternatives—such as
unannounced searches of computer equipment or the installation of
139
monitoring hardware and software —states can narrow the

135. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960).
136. See Legislative Memo: The Electronic Security and Targeting of Online Predators Act (eSTOP), N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (2008), http://www.nyclu.org/node/1814 (last visited Apr.
5, 2011) (“[A] tremendous amount of communication takes places [sic] between adults on social
networking sites. Many people visit MySpace, for example, to engage in political speech or
advocacy, or to learn about music performances. However the proposed e-STOP law would
subject to criminal suspicion and prosecution former [sex] offenders engaged in lawful speech
that is directed to an adult audience, without any intent that the speech reach minors.”).
137. Blogs, short for “web logs,” have become an increasingly popular form of expression
today. See Jay M. Zitter, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R.
6th 407, 416 (2008) (noting that “persons [on blogs] . . . may feel freer to criticize over the
Internet than they would in person or in print” and that many blogs “deal with politics, business,
and [the like]”).
138. Many news websites, such as the New York Times, have blogs or allow members to
adopt nicknames or usernames, post information which other users can view, leave messages or
comments, or direct links to other social networking sites. Furthermore, there are other websites
with social networking capabilities that sex offenders could be banned from using, such as Digg,
which helps facilitate the sharing of information online. What Is Digg?, DIGG, http://
about.digg.com/about (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (“We’re here to promote that conversation and
provide tools for our community to discuss the topics that they’re passionate about.”). Another
example is LinkedIn, a social networking site on which over ninety million professionals
exchange information and employment opportunities. LINKEDIN, http://www.linkedin.com (last
visited Apr. 5, 2011). There are even online social networking and support groups for offenders,
which may help the rehabilitation process by providing job postings and information on where
to locate a house, find a meal, or get an identification card. See MYCONSPACE, http://
www.myconspace.org (last visited Apr. 5, 2011) (noting that this is a “website where you access
information about jobs, put up a resume, find out about civil rights issues and news, [and] post
information about yourself and your life”).
139. See Doe, 734 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (holding a requirement that sex offenders submit to
searches and monitoring of computer equipment unconstitutional as applied to offenders no
longer on probation or parole or under court supervision); Doe v. Marion Cnty., 566 F. Supp. 2d
862, 888 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (holding unconstitutional a law requiring sex offenders no longer
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application of social-networking-site bans to only those sex offenders
who used the Internet or social networking sites in the commission of
140
their underlying offenses. Indeed, some states have taken this more
141
Requiring a nexus between the
narrowly tailored approach.
prohibited online activity and the offense would prevent unnecessary
restrictions on the First Amendment rights of the significant group of
sex offenders who have committed only technical sex offenses and
who did not use a computer, the Internet, or a social networking site
in the commission of the underlying sex offense.
Moreover, states can limit the application of broad socialnetworking-site restrictions to forbid only unlawful and unprotected
expressive activities, such as using social networking sites to
142
communicate with or to seek sexual relationships with minors. Most
state regulations banning sex offenders from social networking sites
make criminal the mere act of accessing the website, even if done with
the intent of engaging in political speech or advocacy, thereby
abridging offenders’ freedom to engage in a substantial amount of
143
lawful expressive activity. The First Amendment should require “a
more precise restriction” than a total ban on all use of these online
144
forums by registered sex offenders.
under any other kind of court supervision to consent to searches of their computer equipment
or Internet-capable devices).
140. The Supreme Court has held, at least in the traditional free speech context, that
limiting restrictions to a certain class of people is a permissible way of narrowly tailoring a law
to promote compelling government interests. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S.
803, 815 (2000) (“Targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning, and the Government cannot
ban speech if targeted blocking is a feasible and effective means of furthering its compelling
interests.”).
141. See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 508.1861(a)(1)–(3) (West 2009) (applying a socialnetworking-site ban to registered sex offenders convicted of crimes against children, offenders
who used a computer or the Internet in the commission of the offense, and offenders assigned
the highest numeric risk level of three).
142. Cf. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (holding that the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251–2260 (2006), was overly broad and
violated the First Amendment because it banned not only real child pornography, which is
unprotected speech, but also sexually explicit images that appeared to depict minors but that
were produced without using real children, abridging the freedom to engage in a substantial
amount of lawful speech).
143. For instance, a North Carolina statute prohibits all registered sex offenders from
accessing or using social networking sites, regardless of the purpose behind their use of such
sites. See supra Part I.B.1.
144. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 258. As the Supreme Court stated in response to the
government’s argument that it was necessary to ban virtual child pornography because
pedophiles can use it as a means to victimize children, “There are many things innocent in
themselves, however, such as cartoons, video games, and candy, that might be used for immoral
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2. Sex Offenders Currently on Probation, Parole, or Supervised
Release. As discussed earlier, relevant sentencing rules will likely
apply when courts are reviewing the constitutionality of socialnetworking-site bans as applied to sex offenders who remain under
state supervision. Under those rules, even if the state action is found
to have some rehabilitative or deterrent purpose and to promote
public safety, there is usually a requirement that the conditions
145
imposed be reasonably related to such ends. For an offender who
has not used a computer, the Internet, or a social networking site in
the commission of the sex offense, it is unlikely that a socialnetworking-site ban would be reasonably related to the offender’s
rehabilitation or to the protection of the public from the offender’s
potential future crimes. Such a ban would not be primarily designed
to prevent the offender from reengaging in the conduct for which he
was convicted.
On the other hand, because sex offenders on probation, parole,
or supervised release have diminished rights, states may face lower
constitutional limits on restricting associational freedoms. Although it
is unclear how much lower the constitutional requirements might be
for restrictions that are not imposed as part of a sentence,
probationers and parolees still retain some First Amendment rights.
Case law suggests that even in the probationer and parolee context,
there should be some narrow tailoring, and restrictions should be “no
greater than needed where they infringe on First Amendment
146
rights.” As several circuit courts have suggested in the context of
sex offender Internet bans, the state’s interest in protecting children
from sexual victimization online can be achieved through significantly
less restrictive means, such as the installation of monitoring and
filtering software, unannounced searches of the offender’s computer,
or prohibiting the use of the Internet without probation-officer

purposes, yet we would not expect those to be prohibited because they can be misused.” Id. at
251.
145. See, e.g., Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir. 1972) (“[W]hen a convict is
conditionally released on parole, the Government retains a substantial interest in insuring that
its rehabilitative goal is not frustrated and that the public is protected from further criminal acts
by the parolee. Although a parolee should enjoy greater freedom in many respects than a
prisoner, we see no reason why the Government may not impose restrictions on the rights of the
parolee that are reasonably and necessarily related to the interests that the Government retains
after his conditional release.”).
146. Best v. Nurse, No. CV 99-3727(JBW), 1999 WL 1243055, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,
1999).
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approval. There is no reason why these less restrictive means would
not be equally applicable in the context of social-networking-site
bans. If an offender who used the Internet or a social networking site
to facilitate the commission of a sex offense poses a significant threat,
however, a more restrictive ban may be the only means by which the
148
state can achieve its compelling interest. Only in those cases should
blanket bans pass constitutional muster.
B. Social-Networking-Site Bans Are Based on Widespread Faulty
Assumptions about Sex Offenders
Current sex offender laws are predicated upon several
widespread but faulty assumptions about sexual violence and sex
offender behavior. Like sex offender registration requirements and
residency restrictions, social-networking-site bans are another wellintentioned—but ultimately misguided—approach to sex offender
management. Broad social-networking-site bans are a flawed means
of protecting children at risk of sexual assault. While failing to
provide real protection to children, such measures also thwart the
successful reintegration of sex offenders into the community, which is
crucial to prevent recidivism. Rather than continuing to blindly enact
social-networking-site bans, states should reexamine the public policy
concerns underlying current sex offender regulation and consider
whether social-networking-site bans adequately serve their purported
goals.
1. Myth: All Registered Sex Offenders Are Violent Sexual
Predators, Rapists, or Pedophiles. Perhaps the most erroneous
assumption underlying American sex offender policy is the belief that
all registered sex offenders are violent sexual predators, rapists, or
pedophiles. Unfortunately, the sex offender registration system’s onesize-fits-all approach has reinforced this notion by requiring the
registration of both violent sex offenders and those who have
committed only nonviolent, technical sex offenses—offenses that
“may have had little or no connection to sex” but that trigger
149
registration in that state.
147. See supra notes 15, 23 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
149. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 39. Sex offender registries are intended to
aid investigations by providing law enforcement with a list of the usual suspects, which can be
cross-checked whenever a sex crime occurs. Id. at 4. This legislative policy choice reflects the
questionable assumption that known sex offenders commit most sex crimes. Id. Yet because sex
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States have made varying policy choices in defining which
150
offenses require criminals to register as sex offenders. As a result,
state sex offender registries vary greatly, so that a qualifying sex
offense in one state may not require registration in the next. Once a
person is a registered sex offender in one state, however, he is always
151
considered a sex offender in any other state.
In many states, offenders who have committed nonviolent
offenses such as prostitution, streaking, or public urination can be
152
required to register. Furthermore, juvenile sex offenders in most
states are subject to sex offender regulations, including registration
153
requirements, community notification, and residency restrictions.
Though some minors’ offenses can be serious, minors are often
subject to sex offender regulations for nonviolent conduct such as
statutory rape in a consensual sexual relationship, “playing doctor,”
154
or “exposing themselves.” Thus, many sex offenders subjected to
harsh and punitive regulations are not the dangerous sexual predators
offenses are largely underreported, and thus underprosecuted, it is likely that most offenders
are not known to law enforcement. Id. In the end, registries can have the effect of providing the
public with a dangerously false sense of security. See id.
150. See BRENDA V. SMITH, NIC/WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON RAPE, FIFTY
STATE SURVEY OF ADULT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS (2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1517369 (listing for each state the offenses
requiring registration, information maintained in registries, information about community
notification and websites, limitations on residency and employment, and duration of the
registration requirement).
151. Under the Adam Walsh Act, a sex offender who is required to register in one state and
who knowingly fails to register or update registration following relocation to another state can
be imprisoned for up to ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006).
152. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 39−40 (finding that at least five states require
registration for adult prostitution-related offenses, at least thirteen require it for urinating in
public (only two states require a child to be present), at least twenty-nine states require
registration for a teenager who had consensual sex with another teenager, and thirty-two states
require flashers and streakers to register (only seven states require a child to be present)).
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. Many commentators have criticized the policy behind requiring children who are
convicted of sex crimes to register as sex offenders. Some of the conduct, “while frowned upon,
does not suggest a danger to the community” and merely “reflects the impulsiveness and
perhaps difficulty with boundaries that many teenagers experience and that most will outgrow
with maturity.” Id. Moreover, even though there is “little statistical research on recidivism by
youth sex offenders, the studies that have been done suggest recidivism rates are quite low.” Id.
at 9. Currently, the “sending of nude or seminude pictures [by text message], a phenomenon
known as sexting, is a fast-growing trend among teens.” Feyerick & Steffen, supra note 9.
Sexting that involves the transmission and receipt of pornographic images of minors is treated as
child pornography in most states, and conviction of a crime against children automatically
triggers sex offender registration in many states. Id. Thus, a child may have to register as a sex
offender for sending naked pictures of himself or herself.

WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

4/14/2011 8:08:24 PM

SEX OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

1893

whom the public fears. Moreover, the more cluttered state registries
are with technical sex offenders, the more difficult it can be for law
enforcement to identify offenders who actually pose a threat to the
155
public and thus warrant careful monitoring.
2. Myth: Strangers Commit Most Sexual Offenses. Another
popular misconception is that most sex offenses are committed by
strangers. Research consistently shows, however, that an
overwhelming majority of sex offenses are committed by victims’
relatives or acquaintances, regardless of whether the victim is a child
156
or an adult. According to the Department of Justice (DOJ), only
13.8 percent of all sexual assault cases reported to law enforcement
157
agencies involved offenders who were strangers to their victims.

155. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he proliferation of people
required to register even though their crimes were not serious makes it harder for law
enforcement to determine which sex offenders warrant careful monitoring.”); id. at 45
(“Another law enforcement official told Human Rights Watch, ‘The expansion of state sex
offender registries to include more offenses and longer registration periods has really
compromised our ability to monitor high-risk sex offenders.’”).
156. See, e.g., DAVID FINKELHOR, HEATHER HAMMER & ANDREA J. SEDLAK, SEXUALLY
ASSAULTED CHILDREN: NATIONAL ESTIMATES AND CHARACTERISTICS 5 (Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Bulletin No. NCJ 214383, 2008), available at http://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/214383.pdf (noting that a 1999 study indicated that 10 percent of all
child sexual assault victims were assaulted by a family member, 64 percent by an acquaintance,
and 25 percent by a stranger—a category that includes someone the child knew by sight but not
on a personal basis); LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN
ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT, 1997, at 4 (Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Bulletin No. NCJ 163392, 1997), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF
(“Three out of four rape/sexual assault victimizations involved offenders . . . with whom the
victim had a prior relationship as a family member, intimate, or acquaintance.”); PATRICIA
TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 21 (2006), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf
(“Only 16.7 percent of all female victims and 22.8 percent of all male victims were raped by a
stranger. In general, female victims tended to be raped by current or former intimates, defined
in this study as spouses, male and female cohabiting partners, dates, boyfriends, and girlfriends.
In comparison, male victims tended to be raped by acquaintances, such as friends, teachers,
coworkers, or neighbors.” (cross-reference omitted)); Shelley Ross Saxer, Banishment of Sex
Offenders: Liberty, Protectionism, Justice, and Alternatives, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1397, 1403
(2009) (“More than ninety percent of sex crimes against children are committed by fathers,
stepfathers, relatives, and acquaintances, rather than by . . . strangers. In fact, the percentage of
nonstranger molestations may be even higher as the majority of this type of sexual abuse is not
reported and/or prosecuted.” (footnotes omitted)).
157. HOWARD N. SNYDER, SEXUAL ASSAULT OF YOUNG CHILDREN AS REPORTED TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT: VICTIM, INCIDENT, AND OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS 10 (Bureau of
Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ 182990, 2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/saycrle.pdf (detailing victim-offender relationship statistics for sexual assault cases).
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The other 86.2 percent of reported sexual assaults were committed by
someone known to the victim, such as a family member or
158
acquaintance. In particular, the DOJ reported that when the victim
was a child, 34.2 percent of offenders were family members and 58.7
159
percent were acquaintances, while only 7 percent were strangers.
Despite these statistics, legislators have chosen to focus on the
160
threat posed by the predatory-stranger sex offender. Legislatures
that enact bans on sex offender use of computers, the Internet, and
social networking sites overstate the threat posed by online sexual
predators “to the neglect of the everyday sexual violence committed
by known and familiar family, friends and acquaintances”—the “most
161
common sexual threats” that victims face. This kind of “strangerdanger” legislation ignores the fact that, even in cyberspace, many
threats that children face are posed by individuals with whom the
162
child has a preexisting relationship.

158. Id.
159. Id. For adult victims, 11.5 percent of sexual assaults were committed by family
members, 61.1 percent were committed by acquaintances, and 27.3 percent were committed by
strangers. Id.
160. See, e.g., Bill Analysis: Hearing on AB-2208 Before the Assemb. Comm. on
Appropriations, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010), available at ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2208_cfa_20100511_154020_asm_comm.html (“The author
contends this bill will provide additional protection from known sex offenders. As the Internet
becomes today’s playground, social networking websites are increasingly being utilized by
children and youth. There must be clear restrictions on sex offenders’ access to these websites to
protect our children on-line.” (quotation marks omitted)).
161. Richard Wright, Introduction to SEX OFFENDERS: FAILED POLICIES, NEW DIRECTIONS
4 (Richard Wright ed., 2009); see also Saxer, supra note 156, at 1403 (“[C]urrent legislation and
public awareness focusing on the stranger may keep us from addressing solutions that would aid
the majority of victims.” (footnotes omitted)). Focusing on online victimization—at the expense
of the more substantial threat of victimization offline—“creates a danger that known risks will
be obscured, and reduces the likelihood that society will address the factors that lead to known
risks, and often inadvertently harm youth in unexpected ways.” Andrew Schrock & danah boyd,
Online Threats to Youth: Solicitation, Harassment, and Problematic Content, in INTERNET
SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, ENHANCING CHILD SAFETY AND ONLINE TECHNOLOGIES
app. C, at 5 (2008), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/sites/cyber.law.harvard.edu/files/
ISTTF_Final_Report.pdf.
162. JANIS WOLAK, KIMBERLY MITCHELL & DAVID FINKELHOR, NAT’L CTR. FOR
MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, ONLINE VICTIMIZATION OF YOUTH: FIVE YEARS LATER 2
(2006), available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV138.pdf (“[F]indings suggest new directions
are needed for safety and prevention education [online]. . . . For instance the increase in
unwanted sexual solicitations and harassment from people youth know offline suggests the focus
should not be simply on the danger from people youth do not know in person.”); see also
Kimberly J. Mitchell, David Finkelhor & Janis Wolak, The Internet and Family and
Acquaintance Sexual Abuse, 10 CHILD MALTREATMENT 49, 49 (2005) (“Although the
stereotype of Internet crimes involves unknown adults meeting juvenile victims online, Internet
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3. Myth: Sex Offenders Recidivate at a Higher Rate than Any
Other Criminals. Sex offenders are subject to more onerous
regulations after serving their terms of imprisonment, probation, or
163
parole than any other group of criminals. Policymakers have
justified this differential treatment on the ground that sex offenders
164
are more likely to reoffend than are any other class of criminals.
Some federal legislators have described sex offenders’ rates of
165
recidivism as “astronomical,” citing rates as high as 90 percent.
Many studies indicate, however, that sex offender recidivism rates are
much lower than policymakers and the public believe. Research
indicates that sex offenders, as a group, do not suffer from higher
166
rates of recidivism than other categories of criminals; in fact, studies

use can also play a role in sexual crimes against minors by family members and
acquaintances.”).
163. See Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 447 (2010) (“The degree to which the lower-level governments have
targeted sex offenders, as distinct from other criminals, is notable.”). Contributing to this
differential treatment of sex offenders is the common assumption that, as a group, sex offenders
specialize in only sex crimes. At least one recent study, however, indicates that, as “a group and
across various measures, sex offenders [have] low levels of specialization and persistence in
offending in absolute and relative terms.” Terance D. Miethe, Jodi Olson & Ojmarrh Mitchell,
Specialization and Persistence in the Arrest Histories of Sex Offenders: A Comparative Analysis
of Alternative Measures and Offense Types, 43 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 204, 204 (2006).
164. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Rep. Anthony Weiner, D-N.Y., New Study Shows Sex
Offenders Living Too Close to Our Kids (Jan. 28, 2007), available at http://www.weiner.
house.gov/news_display.aspx?id=82 (“Unlike other criminals, sex offenders pose a unique
challenge to law enforcement and communities due to high recidivism rates.”).
165. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 25 n.38 (“[W]e know that more than 40
percent of convicted sex offenders will repeat their crimes” (quoting Sen. Kay Bailey
Hutchinson, R-Tex.)); id. (“A study of imprisoned child sex offenders found that 74 percent had
a previous conviction for another child sex offense.” (quoting Rep. Jim Ramstad, R-Minn.)); id.
(“There is a ninety percent likelihood of recidivism for sexual crimes against children. Ninety
percent. That is the standard. That is their record. That is the likelihood. Ninety percent.”
(quoting then-Rep. Mark Foley, R-Fla.)). Unfortunately, policymakers rarely cite and are rarely
asked about the source or credibility of such figures. Id.
166. Recidivism is generally understood as the commission of a subsequent offense, but
there are several operational definitions for this term. For instance, “recidivism may occur when
there is a new arrest, new conviction, or new commitment to custody.” CTR. FOR SEX
OFFENDER MGMT. (CSOM), RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS 2 (2001), available at http://www.
csom.org/pubs/recidsexof.pdf. This explains why studies may have differing outcomes, as each
criterion measures something different. Using subsequent arrests as the determining criterion
for “recidivism” often will result in higher recidivism rates, because not every arrest results in a
conviction. Using subsequent convictions will result in lower recidivism rates, but scholars
generally place more confidence in this criterion, as it means the offender has been through the
legal process and was found guilty. Finally, using subsequent incarceration as a criterion can
yield different results, as there are two ways in which offenders may be sent back to prison. One
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find that “recidivism rates for sex offenders are lower than for the
167
general criminal population.”
For example, a 2003 DOJ study of sex offenders released from
prisons in fifteen states in 1994 found that only 5.3 percent were
rearrested for a new sex crime within three years of release, and only
168
3.5 percent were convicted. As compared to non-sex offenders
released from state prison, “sex offenders had a lower overall rearrest
169
rate.” The overall rearrest rate of non-sex offenders was 68 percent,
whereas the rearrest rate of sex offenders—for any type of offense,
170
not just sex offenses—was 43 percent. A study from the New York
State Division of Criminal Justice Services also revealed that
registered sex offenders are more likely to be rearrested for a non-sex
offense than for a sex offense and that “sex offenders are arrested
and/or convicted of committing a new sex crime at a lower rate than
171
other offenders who commit other new non-sexual crimes.”
The sex offender registration regime reflects the misconception
that offenders who have committed sex crimes in the past will likely
is through the commission of a new offense, and the other is through a technical violation of
parole, which may not involve a subsequent criminal offense, but rather a violation of a
condition of release, such as consuming alcohol. Id. Moreover, it is important to distinguish
whether the new arrest, conviction, or commitment to custody is for a new sex offense or for a
non-sex offense. See id. at 3 (“For the purpose of their studies, researchers must determine what
specific behaviors qualify sex offenders as recidivists. They must decide if only sex offenses will
be considered, or if the commission of any crime is sufficient to be classified as a recidivating
offense.”). Overall, how one defines “recidivism” is very important.
167. CSOM, MYTHS AND FACTS ABOUT SEX OFFENDERS 3 (2000), available at http://www.
csom.org/pubs/mythsfacts.pdf.
168. PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, RECIDIVISM OF
SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM PRISON IN 1994, at 1−2 (Bureau of Justice Statistics, Bulletin
No. NCJ 198281, 2003), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf
(reporting that sex offenders are less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any
offense; specifically, within three years of release only 43 percent of sex offenders are rearrested
as compared to 68 percent of non-sex offenders, and only 5.3 percent of sex offenders are
rearrested for another sex crime).
169. Id. at 2.
170. Id. at 14. Compared to other groups of offenders, sex offenders’ rearrest rate was low.
Robbers’ rearrest rate was 70.2 percent, larcenists’ was 74.6 percent, and burglars’ was 74
percent. Those convicted of homicide had the lowest rearrest rate, 40.7 percent. Id.
171. N.Y. STATE DIV. OF PROB. & CORR. ALTS., RESEARCH BULLETIN: SEX OFFENDER
POPULATIONS, RECIDIVISM AND ACTUARIAL ASSESSMENT 4 (2007), available at http://www.
dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/somgmtbulletinmay2007.pdf (emphasis omitted). Of sex offenders
appearing on the registry, 15 percent were arrested for a new offense within a year, and only 2
percent were arrested for a new sex offense. Id. at 3. The same report also revealed that for
individuals convicted of any type of crime, 8.7 percent were rearrested within three years for
violent felony offenses, 7 percent for felony drug offenses, and 14.8 percent for other felony
offenses. Id. at 4.
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do so again. The overemphasis on known sex offenders reinforces the
erroneous assumption that previously convicted sex offenders are,
and will continue to be, responsible for most sex crimes. That is a
dangerous approach to sex-offender policy, given that “[t]he vast
majority of sex crimes are committed by someone who is not on the
172
Sex Offender Registry.” According to a 1997 DOJ study, six out of
seven offenders imprisoned for rape or sexual assault had not
173
previously been convicted of a violent sex crime. Moreover, a study
of New York prisoners revealed that during 2005–06, approximately
94 percent of those arrested for sex offenses had no prior sex-offense
174
convictions. None of these offenders would have been on the sex
175
offender registry. As a result, laws promoting Internet safety should
be designed with the presupposition that most online sexual predators
are likely not on any sex offender registry.
172. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/nsor/som_mythsandfacts.htm (last
updated Apr. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
173. GREENFELD, supra note 156, at 22.
174. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex Offenders, supra note 172.
175. See JUSTICE POLICY INST., REGISTERING HARM: HOW SEX OFFENSE REGISTRIES
FAIL YOUTH AND COMMUNITIES 13 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/
upload/08-11_RPT_WalshActRegisteringHarm_JJ-PS.pdf (“As most people who commit sex
offenses are ‘first-time offenders,’ meaning that they have never been convicted of a sex offense,
the majority of people committing sex offenses would not already be on the registry.”).
Furthermore, because “most sex crimes are not reported, and as a result, are not prosecuted,”
there is an even stronger likelihood that most sex offenders who pose a threat to the public are
not already known to law enforcement. “Myths and Facts”: Current Research on Managing Sex
Offenders, supra note 172; see also CSOM, supra note 167, at 2 (“A 1992 study estimated that
only 12% of rapes were reported. The National Crime Victimization Surveys conducted in 1994,
1995, and 1998 indicate that only 32% of sexual assaults against persons 12 or older were
reported to law enforcement. . . . The low rate of reporting leads to the conclusion
that . . . convicted sex offenders . . . in the United States represent less than 10% of all sex
offenders living in communities nationwide.” (citations omitted)). As a result, researchers have
concluded that sex offender registries have limited value in preventing sex crimes. See JUSTICE
POLICY INST., supra, at 14–15 (“The supposed purpose of the registries is to protect youth and
adults from potential sexual predators. But evidence shows that most people who experience
sexual abuse are victimized by people they know, including family members, and thus registries
do not necessarily make us safer.”). Sex offender registries are only useful to the extent that
they inform law enforcement authorities and the public of known sex offenders—which cannot
include offenders who are not on the registry. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2,
at 44−45 (quoting a Minnesota law enforcement official, who explained, “[Minnesota’s registry]
gives us a place to start, but most suspects we arrest are not previously convicted sex offenders.
Last year, Minnesota had 585 sex offender convictions, and only 58 of those individuals had a
prior conviction for a sex offense.”); Miethe et al., supra note 163, at 225 (“By narrowing initial
investigation of sex crimes to registered sex offenders, police agencies may help promote the
stereotypical image of specialization and thereby inadvertently increase the victimization risks
from those sexual predators who have remained undetected by the criminal justice system.”).
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It is similarly erroneous to assume that cordoning sex offenders
off from society and modern life—offline as well as online—will help
reduce recidivism. Research shows that this approach to sex offender
management is counterproductive to the rehabilitation of offenders
and, as a result, may put society in more danger by aggravating
factors associated with recidivism. According to researchers, “[T]he
resulting stigmatization of sex offenders is likely to result in
disruption of their relationships, loss of or difficulties finding jobs,
difficulties finding housing, and decreased psychological well-being,
176
all factors that could increase their risk of recidivism.” Existing sex
offender policies make it harder for sex offenders to reenter society,
start new lives, and form new relationships, thus making it more
177
difficult for them to “discard their criminal patterns.” By placing
“further obstacles for the [sex] offender to regain stability in his life,”
such punitive laws exacerbate the risk of recidivism, while at the same
time instilling a false sense of security in the communities they are
178
supposed to protect.
4. Myth: Sex Offenders Are Increasingly Targeting Children
Online. Contrary to legislators’ claims that convicted sex offenders
are increasingly targeting children online, studies show decreasing
percentages of youth are receiving unwanted sexual solicitations on
179
the Internet. Further, Internet sex crimes against minors have not

176. Hollida Wakefield, The Vilification of Sex Offenders: Do Laws Targeting Sex Offenders
Increase Recidivism and Sexual Violence?, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIV. COMMITMENT: SCI. &
L. 141, 141 (2006); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that sex offender
regulations such as residency restrictions can “push former offenders away from the supervision,
treatment, stability, and supportive networks they may need to build and maintain successful,
law abiding lives”).
177. Wakefield, supra note 176, at 142.
178. Amol N. Sinha, Sects’ Offenders: The Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency Laws and
Their Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 343, 344−45
(2010); see also Jill S. Levenson & Leo P. Cotter, The Impact of Sex Offender Residence
Restrictions: 1,000 Feet from Danger or One Step From Absurd?, 49 INT’L J. OFFENDER
THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 168, 175 (2005) (finding that residency restrictions may
increase the types of stressors that can trigger reoffense); Wakefield, supra note 176 (suggesting
that sex offender registries, notification requirements, and residency restrictions may actually
make it more likely that sex offenders will reoffend).
179. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 2 (noting that a second survey revealed a smaller
proportion of youth who received unwanted sexual advances online, although aggressive
solicitations did not similarly decline); Janis Wolak, David Finkelhor, Kimberly J. Mitchell &
Michelle L. Ybarra, Online “Predators” and Their Victims: Myths, Realities and Implications for
Prevention and Treatment, 63 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 111, 121 (2008) (“Sex crimes against youth
have not increased. . . . [S]everal sex crime and abuse indicators have shown marked declines

WYNTON IN PRINTER PROOF.DOC

2011]

4/14/2011 8:08:24 PM

SEX OFFENDERS AND SOCIAL NETWORKS

1899

surpassed the number of sex crimes committed against minors
180
offline. One recent study revealed that a “smaller proportion of
youth Internet users received unwanted sexual solicitations in [2005]
than in [1999–2000]”; approximately one in seven children surveyed
181
received solicitations in 2005, compared to one in five in 2000. The
same study indicated that “[a]cquaintances played a growing role in
182
many of the unwanted solicitation incidents.” It also found that
roughly half of the unwanted sexual solicitations came from other
183
minors. Another study revealed that “Internet sex crimes involving
adults and juveniles more often fit a model of statutory rape—adult
offenders who meet, develop relationships with, and openly seduce
underage teenagers—than a model of forcible sexual assault or
184
pedophilic child molesting.” Such data may indicate a need for
different policy approaches, such as focusing more prevention efforts
on youth who engage in risky online behavior.

during the same period that Internet use has been expanding. From 1990 to 2005, the number of
sex abuse cases substantiated by child protective authorities declined 51% . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
180. Schrock & boyd, supra note 161, app. C, at 10.
181. WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 15.
182. Id. at 1 (“In [Youth Internet Safety Survey 2], 14% of solicitations were from offline
friends and acquaintances compared to only 3% in [Youth Internet Safety Survey 1].”); see also
Schrock & boyd, supra note 161, app. C, at 10, 15 (“[T]he majority of sexual molestations are
perpetrated primarily by those the victim knows offline, mainly by family members or
acquaintances. This appears to be partly true of Internet-initiated sexual offenses as well, as a
considerable percentage (44%) of Internet sexual offenders known to youth victims were family
members. . . . [Fifty-six percent] were committed by people known to the victim offline,
including neighbors, friends’ parents, leaders of youth organizations, and teachers; known cases
involving strangers are extremely rare.” (citations omitted)).
183. See WOLAK ET AL., supra note 162, at 17 (“Those younger than 18 were identified as
solicitors in a substantial number of incidents—43% of all solicitations and 44% of aggressive
solicitations.”). Based upon data from Youth Internet Safety Survey 2, conducted in 2005, 43
percent of unwanted sexual solicitations came from individuals seventeen years of age and
younger, 30 percent came from persons eighteen to twenty-five years of age, 9 percent from
people twenty-six years of age and older, and 18 percent were unknown. Id. at 25 tbl.4.
184. Id. at 111. In 2000, there were an estimated five hundred arrests by federal, state, and
local law enforcement for Internet-initiated sex crimes, 95 percent of which were nonforcible.
Id. at 114–15. This research indicates that efforts to limit the occurrence of Internet sex crimes
should not be focused only on offenders, but also on educating youth about sexual violence and
online risk-taking. This may help to reduce the occurrence of Internet-initiated sex crimes. Cf.
INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, supra note 161, at 28 (observing that “in most
incidents of Internet-initiated offline encounters between adults and minors, the minor knows
that the adult is older (usually in his or her twenties), knows that sex is desired, and believes that
she or he can consent to a sexual encounter”).
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Although the threat posed by some sex offenders online is real, it
is far less substantial than the threat that predators pose offline. In
addition, focusing on online sexual predators detracts attention from
other emerging threats that children face on the Internet, such as
185
online harassment and bullying.
5. Myth: Internet Restrictions Will Help Protect Minors Online.
Poorly considered laws such as blanket social-networking-site bans
may prove impractical to enforce. Though some states specify
methods of enforcement in their statutes—such as the installation of
monitoring software or periodic, unannounced examinations of the
186
offender’s computer or Internet-enabled devices —a number of
187
states do not. Even those states that provide for enforcement
through monitoring technologies may encounter problems because
“probation officers generally lack the necessary funding for proper
monitoring equipment and often fail to obtain the technical expertise
188
required for adequate training.” Moreover, the effectiveness of
filtering technologies has been questioned as the number of online
social networks increases, making it “almost impossible for probation
189
officers to ensure that these [filtering] programs remain up-to-date.”
Although it may be possible to exclude sex offenders from certain
physical locations through residency restrictions, this exclusionary
185. INTERNET SAFETY TECHNICAL TASK FORCE, supra note 161, at 4 (“Bullying and
harassment, most often by peers, are the most frequent threats that minors face, both online and
offline.”); see also Heather Braegger, Rutgers University Student Tyler Clementi Yet Another
Victim of Bullying and Harassment, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (Oct. 4, 2010), http://
www.associatedcontent.com/article/5860312/rutgers_university_student_tyler_clementi.html
(“A college student at Rutgers University jumped to his death in what is yet another suicide that
can be linked to bullying.”).
186. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-3-7(a)(7.11)(ii)–(iii) (Supp. 2010) (requiring
offenders to submit to “periodic unannounced examinations of the offender’s computer” or
Internet-capable device and mandating the installation of hardware or software systems that
monitor Internet use).
187. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.5 (Supp. 2010) (failing to provide specific methods
of enforcement for its social-networking-site ban).
188. Brant, supra note 7, at 805 (noting that “the growth of the personal computer and the
Internet has further complicated busy probation officers’ caseloads with offenders who are often
more computer savvy than the officers attempting to supervise them”).
189. Id.; see also Jane Adele Regina, Comment, Access Denied: Imposing Statutory Penalties
on Sex Offenders Who Violate Restricted Internet Access as a Condition of Probation, 4 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 187, 203 (2007) (“[A]n unwieldy Internet landscape complicated by the
technological prowess of particular offenders threatens every method of computer surveillance
with the potential for subversion. . . . [P]robation officers face the impractical task of staying
abreast of myriad pornographic sites that morph and change on a daily basis in order to
effectively program the filtering software.”).
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approach may prove unworkable in cyberspace, especially as more
190
website operators incorporate social networking features. The
anonymity afforded by the Internet means that offenders can “merely
borrow computers or choose different login names” to access
191
restricted areas. In light of the existing technological limitations,
these restrictions may not achieve the objectives driving Internet and
social-networking-site bans.
CONCLUSION
Concerns with state social-networking-site bans are twofold:
First, these bans impermissibly restrict the First Amendment rights of
sex offenders, who do not lose their constitutional rights just because
they have committed a sex offense. Second, even if the bans are
constitutional as applied to certain offenders, they are unlikely to
keep minors safe online because they are predicated on mistaken
premises about sexual violence and sex offender behavior.
Several courts reviewing the constitutionality of Internet-related
restrictions have acknowledged the dearth of precedent concerning
the rights of sex offenders, especially those who are no longer on
probation, parole, or supervised release. In the absence of case law
suggesting that these offenders have diminished constitutional rights
as a general matter, courts have found such restrictions
unconstitutional. In light of these recent cases, it is critical that state
legislatures strike the right balance between offenders’ liberty
interests and public safety. Some of these restrictions have failed to

190. As more websites move toward social networking models, the distinction between a
non-social networking site and a social networking site has become less clear. For instance,
many news websites, such as CNN.com or NYTimes.com, have blogs. Thus, members may
adopt nicknames or usernames; post information that other users can view; and leave messages,
comments, or direct links to other social networking sites. Will a registered sex offender be able
to read the New York Times online, or will he be relegated to reading the print version? What
happens when the New York Times goes out of print? See Jolie O’Dell, New York Times Will
Go Out of “Print” Sometime in the Future, MASHABLE (Sept. 8, 2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/09/08/nytimes-print (“At a recent conference, The New York Times’
publisher and chairman Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., stated that he eventually expects the ‘Gray
Lady’ will no longer be a physical newspaper.”).
191. Regina, supra note 189, at 199; see also United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Despite the apparent constraint, the [defendant] may visit a library,
cybercafe, even an airport, and log onto the Internet. The Internet is also accessible via web-t.v.
by attaching an electronic device to a television. Consequently, if the district court targeted this
special condition . . . to prevent [the defendant from] using the Internet to order child
pornography, it missed the mark.”).
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find the appropriate balance, however, and impermissibly burden sex
offenders’ rights of association and expression.
Studies demonstrate that the majority of existing sex offender
policies are not based on reliable evidence, and they are not sensitive
to the needs and interests of the victims, the general public, or the
offenders. Like other existing policies, social-networking-site bans are
not likely to produce any visible public safety gains or significant
reductions in offender recidivism. In fact, they may do more harm
than good by instilling a false sense of security among the public and
by perpetuating myths about the nature of sexual violence, making it
more difficult for legislators to craft effective solutions. Rather than
promulgating popular but highly ineffective laws such as socialnetworking-site bans, states should use available research to design
laws that will serve the ends that they are intended to meet, restricting
the rights of sex offenders only to the extent necessary to meet these
192
ends.
This is not to say that all social-networking-site bans are per se
inappropriate. For some offenders—specifically, those who have used
the Internet or a social networking site in the commission of the
underlying sex offense—such bans may be an appropriate condition
of probation or parole. States considering this type of legislation
should consider how federal courts have struck a balance between
protecting the public and rehabilitating the offender on the one hand,
and protecting the offender’s liberty interests on the other. Federal
courts have struck this balance by generally opposing unconditional
Internet bans and by upholding restrictions only when there is a
sufficient nexus between the underlying conduct and the Internet or
social-networking-site ban. Given the political unpopularity of sex
offenders, bans on sex offender Internet use are better left to the
courts, which can fashion more individualized conditions tailored to
the specific offense and the specific offender before them. This
practice would lower the risk that state legislatures will unfairly
infringe on offenders’ rights through the one-size-fits-all approaches
that many have taken. Blanket bans from the Internet and social
networking sites are not the way to protect children from sexual

192. States considering such legislation should take active steps toward formulating wellinformed sex offender policies based on what is known about sexual violence, sex offenders, and
strategies that will reduce recidivism and ultimately increase public safety. This can be
facilitated by hosting public forums or by supporting research institutions and experts in
conducting research on sex offender treatment and the effectiveness of existing policies.
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abuse. Unfortunately, the reality is that “[p]eople want a silver bullet
that will protect their children, [but] there is no silver bullet. There is
193
no simple cure to the very complex problem of sexual violence.”

193. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 2, at 2 (alteration in original) (quoting Patty
Wetterling, a child safety advocate whose son was abducted in 1989 and is still missing).

